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Germany in the First World War is a book 
written by two German historians, Ge�
rhard Hirschfeld, Professor at University 
of Stuttgart and Gerd Krumeich, Pro�
fessor Emeritus of Modern History at 
the Heinrich Heine University in Dus�
seldorf. Widely considered to be among 
the most prominent researchers and his�
torians of the First World War, the two 
authors now offer an overview of Great 
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War overview, envisaged as a history of 
the war from the German point of view.1 
They were motivated by the fact that the 
contemporary Germans have quite super�
ficial knowledge of the First World War 
and by the pressing need to answer many 
queries of their foreign colleagues about 
the German view of certain crucial issues 
during the war. The authors aim to ex�
plore the effects and consequences of the 
war through the prism of soldiers in the 
trenches, home front, and various simi�
lar approaches. In order to achieve these 
goals, the authors have included over one 
hundred images, important diplomatic 
and military documents, but also letters 
and diaries of “common people” in war�
time surroundings.
The book is divided into twelve chap�
ters, arranged in chronological order 
with subjects such as war propaganda, 
home front, and industrialization of war. 
Every chapter is followed by a useful bi�
bliography used for the compilation of 
its content. The first quarter of the book 
offers an interpretation of the origins 
and causes of the war. Hirschfeld and 
Krumeich consider that the turn of the 
century saw not only the beginning of a 
chain of events that included the Russo-
Japanese war, the Balkan war of 1912, and 
the so-called near-war crises, but also, as 
a corollary of those events and the arms 
race, the rise of the peculiar popular senti�
ment: “pre-war mentality”. There was the 
popular belief widespread amongst poli�
ticians, diplomatic and military as well as 
scientists, journalists, writers and artists, 
that the outbreak of a great war just a 
matter of time. Under the influence of the 
widely accepted Social Darwinism, and 
the notions of advanced and backward 
1 Besides this book, they were co-editors 
of Enzyklopädie Erster Weltkrieg, with 
Irina Renz and Markus Pöhlmann (Pad�
erborn: Schöningh, 20142.
races, war was believed to be “the right 
of might”. According to the authors, such 
ideas found fertile soil in Wilhelminian 
Germany.
At the turn of the twentieth century 
Germany was in the period of steady eco�
nomic and demographic growth. Its po�
pulation had grown from approximately 
50 million in 1880 to 70 million in 1910. 
The German leadership pursued the risky 
policy of colonial expansion. To be true, 
lagging behind the Netherlands and Great 
Britain which had acquired their colonial 
possessions in the early modern period of 
European history, Germany could only at�
tain colonies through politics of extortion 
or war. The German Empire embarked 
on the aggressive “Weltpolitik” which was 
propped by construction by construction 
of a powerful fleet especially under the lea�
dership of admiral von Tirpitz from 1897 
onwards. The Schlieffen plan was also made 
at that time with a view to finding solution 
for the conduct of a two front war.
Reviewing the near-war crises from 
the Moroccan affair of 1905 to the Bal�
kan wars, the authors explain how the 
“psychosis” of a surrounded power came 
into being in Germany. It was the belief 
that as a Central European power Ger�
many was surrounded by the increasingly 
hostile neighbours frightened of its pro�
gress and strength that gave birth to the 
fear of “Einkreisung”, the encirclement. 
Such fears were of immense importance 
in the July Crisis.
Hirschfeld’s and Krumeich’s account 
of the July Crisis hinges on three crucial 
points. First, the “simply irresponsible” 
German policy of testing the Triple En�
tente between Great Britain, France and 
Russia and especially the Russian resolve 
to wage war proved to have been a grave 
mistake. Second, the aggressive Austro-
Hungarian policy towards Serbia in spite 
of the lack of evidence for the Serbian 
government’s complicity in the Sarajevo 
assassination, which continued even after 
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Serbia had given a response considered as 
“a masterpiece in style of traditional diplo�
macy” to Vienna’s ultimatum, led to further 
aggravation of the situation. Finally, the 
Russian and Austro-Hungarian general 
mobilisation made the German leadership 
put their plans into motion. The German 
responsibility, according to Hirschfeld and 
Krumeich, is exemplified in the conduct 
of two key actors: Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg’s irresponsible intention to test 
the will of Russia and its allies to engage in 
a war and the “better now than later” atti�
tude of the Chief of Staff von Moltke the 
Younger. There was also the shared illusion, 
despite some predictions and warnings, 
that the war would be a brief affair — si�
milar to those of the 1870s — that plunged 
the governments concerned into it. In such 
circumstances, the Clausewitz formula that 
“a war is merely the continuation of policy 
by other means” was accepted. Euphoric 
reaction to the outbreak of war in the so 
called “August experience” is vividly des�
cribed in a chapter of a same name. Using 
interesting patriotic songs and poems as il�
lustration the authors explain the depths of 
uncritical attitudes of population through 
examples of scientists, writers, artists who 
accepted a kind of collective enthusiasm.
Having been exhausted after just 
few weeks of war, the German militant 
euphoria rapidly dissipated. The failure 
of the Schlieffen plan led to continuation 
of the war and the crimes in Belgium ac�
counted for the lost propaganda war. The 
largest part of the chapter is devoted to 
the Western and Eastern front where the 
German army mainly fought. There is also 
a short description of the German parti�
cipation in the Balkan front, mainly in 
autumn 1915 against Serbia. The authors 
conclude this part of the book with the 
Swiss criminologist Rudolf Archibald 
Reiss’ report on Austro-Hungarian war 
crimes in Serbia; they also point out the 
k. u. k. Army headquarters view of these 
atrocities as “senseless reprisals”.
The chapters “Propaganda” and “Home 
front” deal with Germany’s efforts to mo�
bilise its full capacities in the ongoing war. 
The main thesis here is that the Germans 
never managed to counter the British and 
French in terms of propaganda. This hap�
pened because they were unable, or unin�
terested, to show a true front suffering but 
rather tried to create a “hero image” for 
its population. On the other hand, Britain 
and France were much more successful in 
utilising their total capacities for war in 
comparison with Germany. The atrocities 
committed in Belgium gave substance 
to the image of “the Hun” and provided 
German enemies with a powerful propa�
ganda tool.
The great battles of 1916-17 at Verdun, 
Somme and the Brusilov Offensive reflec�
ted the increasing industrialization of war 
with the attendant rapid growth in the 
number of casualties. Also, the narrative 
is enriched with the excerpts from diaries 
of the combatants and the letters sent to 
their families in which the atmosphere in 
the front was brought to life. “It is terrible 
how much blood flowed and the recent 
successes are too small in relation to the 
great sacrifices that have been made,” 
wrote a German sergeant in early March 
1916. The rising casualty count is explai�
ned in the next chapter “The industriali�
zation of war”. This industrialisation is il�
lustrated with statistics: in the beginning 
of the war, Germany produced around 
40,000 rifles and in 1916 that number 
rose to c. 250,000. The production of 
artillery ammunitions also rose from 11 
million rounds per month in 1914 to c. 
220 million in March 1916. The usage of 
tanks, U-boats and poisonous gas warfare 
is taken into account as well.
The last quarter of the book deals 
with the issues of politics in a total war, 
German defeat, the peace conference and 
the legacies of the Great War. The authors 
provide a short overview of the “Septem�
berprogram” that envisaged a German 
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dominated Europe and the creation of a 
colonial empire in Central Africa. Howe�
ver, unlike the “Fischer school”, they do 
not considered this programme as the 
key document for the history of German 
imperialism. Instead, the authors endorse 
— “as most experts now agree” — an ap�
proach based on Wolfgang J. Mommsen’s 
theory of “Formelkompromiss” according 
to which certain politicians, the military, 
several rich individuals and industrialists 
sought for the realisation of the program. 
It also included the idea of ethnic clean�
sing of the Poles as a means of securing 
Germany’s eastern border which was later 
incorporated into Nazi plans for the ex�
pansion to the East. The closing months 
of the war saw the failure of German 
offensive in the West. However, the Ger�
man Supreme? Command’s hiding of the 
truth from the public led to the birth of 
the “stab in the back” legend, an illusion 
that the undefeated German army was 
betrayed in November 1918. With the 
defeat in the West, the German-imposed 
terms of the Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest 
treaties were discarded and with them the 
conquest of Poland, the Baltic Region 
Romania and Ukraine.
The main legacy of the First World 
War for German society, Hirschfeld and 
Krumeich stress, is a non-existence of the 
shared memory or consensus over the 
reasons for the defeat and its consequen�
ces. Such situation facilitated the rise of 
Nationalists and Anti-Republicans in the 
Weimar Republic and militated against 
the development of democratic culture 
in Germany between the two world wars. 
The closing chapter is followed by a short 
and useful chronology of the most impor�
tant events in the first two decades of the 
20th century.
In conclusion, Deutschland im Ersten 
Weltkrieg is a short, interesting and infor�
mative book which contributes to unders�
tanding of the main research topics of the 
First World War from the German pers�
pective. With a lot of excerpts from ori�
ginal documents, the authors produced a 
well-written book that can serve as a sui�
table starting point for future researchers.
